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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cheryl Holmstrom, the plaintiff-appellant, submits this 
Brief in reply to the Brief submitted by C.R. England and 
Joseph Hyatt, the defendants-appellees. 
Ms. Holmstrom stands by her legal analysis, and its 
application to the instant dispute, that is set forth in her 
Opening Brief. She seeks to refrain from unnecessarily 
repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which 
she remains confident, that appear in that Brief. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLEES MISS THE POINT IN THEIR RESPONSE TO 
MS. HOLMSTROM'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE A "HAZARDOUS ROUTE" 
INSTRUCTION. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
THAT INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
As explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief, her 
District Court case and trial presentation dealt, in 
substantial part, with Mr. Hyatt's selection of a route that 
he knew to be unsafe. See, e.g., the parts of Mr. Hyatt's 
trial testimony that are set forth at pages 34-36 of 
Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief. Mr. Hyatt testified, for 
example, that he knew that the intersection of Park and 
Division, for a driver, like himself, making a right turn from 
Park onto Division, constituted a dangerous condition. Tr. 
Vol. II, 124. Mr. Hyatt also acknowledged that he was, and 
had been, for many years, familiar with the blind nature of 
that turn, and that there was another route he could have 
taken that would have avoided the problems associated with 
turning from that blind intersection coupled with the S-curve 
out of which Ms. Holmstrom was coming just before the 
collision occurred {id., 136-37). There was, contrary to the 
suggestion appearing in Appellees' Brief, utterly no evidence 
that the route taken by Ms. Holmstrom (simply proceeding 
westbound down Division) was hazardous or that she knew or 
should have known it was hazardous.1 In any event, it is not 
the stretch of road, given Ms., Holmstrom's theory of the case, 
that was significant. It was the route chosen by Mr. Hyatt in 
his trip of driving his truck around the block that was 
important. 
Appellees' argument that Ms. Holmstrom had to define the 
meaning of the word "hazardous" in the proposed instruction is 
specious. Not every word in every jury instruction needs to 
be defined. Also, given the evidence in the case and 
Ms. Holmstrom's theory of liability, the series of rhetorical 
questions posed by appellees at pages 5-6 of their Brief 
should be accorded no significance. Given the evidence 
1
 Although it is not directly relevant to the issue, Ms. Holmstrom's 
counsel feel constrained to point out that Ms. Holmstrom's former 
boyfriend, James Johnson, explained, at trial, that he had simply assumed 
that Ms. Holmstrom was traveling a route she had frequently traveled, but 
that he really did not know one way or another. Tr. Vol. IV, 584. 
Ms. Holmstrom (the only other witness to testify on that subject) testified 
2 
presented, and Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case, it would 
have been clear to the jury, if the proposed instruction had 
been given, that the "hazardous" concept applied to 
Mr. Hyatt's decision to make a right turn, from Park onto 
Division, driving his long tractor unit, when he knew that he 
would be required to initiate a blind turn without knowing 
whether there was any vehicle coming through the S-curve. 
Mr. Hyatt clearly acknowledged that that was the case and that 
he knew he would have to pull into Ms. Holmstrom's lane of 
travel to make the turn. See record citations set forth at 
page 35 of Holmstrom's Opening Brief. For C.R. England and 
Mr. Hyatt to suggest, in these circumstances, that "hazardous" 
could have meant something to do with the presence of deaf or 
blind children in the vicinity, the storing of hazardous 
materials adjacent to the roadway, or that the road was 
slippery or bumpy or in bad repair makes no sense and focuses 
the beam of weakness on their argument with respect to this 
aspect of this Appeal. 
Appellees argue that Ms. Holmstrom "has failed to 
establish any duty on the part of [Mr. Hyatt] to take a 
different route." Appellees' Brief at 6. Ms. Holmstrom 
acknowledges that there is no state statute or city ordinance 
that she was not familiar with the route she was taking when the collision 
occurred. Tr. Vol. Ill, 505. 
3 
on which her proposed instruction was based, but contends that 
the principles of Utah case law cited in her Opening Brief (at 
12) should be construed to apply to the operator of a motor 
vehicle, and in the context of this case, the conduct of 
Mr. Hyatt. Ms. Holmstrom has never contended, contrary to 
appellees' argument, that drivers have a duty to take the 
"least traveled" route. Nor, contrary to appellees' 
suggestion, has Ms. Holmstrom contended (nor does the proposed 
instruction so read) that a driver's taking a hazardous route 
necessarily renders that driver's conduct negligent. It was 
important to Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case that the jury 
be instructed that taking a hazardous route (here, Mr. Hyatt's 
driving his truck on a route that would necessitate his 
starting his turn when he could not see whether another 
vehicle was coming and moving into that vehicle's lane of 
travel, setting up an emergency response such as 
Ms. Holmstrom's) could be considered by the jury to be an 
index of negligence. At page 6 of their Brief, appellees 
further misstate Ms. Holmstrom's contention by saying that she 
"complains of a blind S-curve, foliage near the corner and old 
cars parked on the corner." Ms. Holmstrom has never 
"complained of" such things. She has "complained of" 
Mr. Hyatt's taking a route, given those considerations, that 
was unsafe. Nor has Ms. Holmstrom contended that "the 
4 
motoring public must cease using this public roadway/7 
Appellees' Brief, at 6. Her contention has been and remains 
that Mr. Hyatt, especially driving the vehicle he was driving, 
should not have driven a route that necessitated his making a 
turn that he acknowledged was unsafe. 
Appellees criticize Ms. Holmstrom for failing to lay out 
the facts in the Utah cases and an Illinois case cited in her 
Opening Brief, all of which deal with the conduct of 
pedestrians. Ms. Holmstrom's counsel are mindful of the fact 
that the Court will read all cases cited and are of the view 
that it is not always, if ever, necessary to burden a brief 
with recitation of facts that can be and are easily found upon 
review of cited cases. In any event, the discussion during 
the jury instruction conference (Tr. Vol. V, 808-14), which 
was cited in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief at page 12, makes 
it clear that everyone involved in that conference knew that 
these are pedestrian cases. There is no secret, and never has 
been, that the Utah cases upon which Ms. Holmstrom premised 
her proposed jury instruction are pedestrian cases and that 
they came about in an era when contributory negligence was a 
complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery. Neither of those 
things makes an outcome-determinative difference. The cases 
brought to the attention of the District Court by 
Ms. Holmstrom and cited in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief all 
5 
deal with the selection and taking of an allegedly unsafe 
route by a party to a negligence lawsuit. The concept is well 
established that the selection of an unsafe route when safer 
routes are available can lead to a finding of fault, not that 
it must. There is no reason, in law or in logic, why the same 
principle recognized in the Utah cases should not be 
determined to apply to driver conduct,2 by a defendant or a 
plaintiff, any less than it does to a pedestrian plaintiff. 
Appellees' argument, set forth at page 8 of their Brief, 
that "plaintiff's negligence was at least equal to any 
negligence she wants to bestow upon the defendant for the 
defendant's use of that road," is perhaps the best example of 
the weakness of appellees' response to Ms. Holmstrom's 
argument and of the strength of Ms. Holmstrom's position. 
First, the question at issue here is the giving of a jury 
instruction which it was the District Court's duty to give, 
consistent with Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case. E.g., 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); Startin v. 
Madsen, 237 P.2d 835 (Utah 1951) (both cases cited at page 12 
of Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief). It should have been left 
to the jury to decide whether either driver's route selection 
2
 For a case in which a driver's selection of an unsafe route was 
recognized tc be an index of negligence, see, Hathaway v. Coleman, 169 Pac. 
414 (Cal. App. 1917). 
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was an index of that party's negligence. Second, there was, 
in connection with Ms. Holmstrom's conduct, utterly no 
evidence — nor did it have anything to do with appellees' 
theory of the case — that the route taken by Ms. Holmstrom 
was supposedly hazardous or that Ms. Holmstrom knew or should 
have known that the route that she was taking was supposedly 
hazardous. 
Appellees contend that any error inhering in the District 
Court's failure to give the proposed instruction was harmless, 
but appellees make no persuasive argument in favor of that 
proposition. As explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief, 
at 13-16, the significance of the District Court's refusal to 
give the requested instruction cannot be overstated. The 
Court's specifically instructing the jury on this index of 
negligence would have been reasonably expected to tip the 
scales for the jury to decide that Mr. Hyatt was "negligent 
enough" to cause the jury to conclude that his negligence was, 
indeed, a "substantial factor" in causing Ms. Holmstrom's 
injuries and damages. It is noteworthy that appellees have 
not contested the correctness of this analysis, a lengthier 
version of which is set forth in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief 
at 12-13. 
Without the xxhazardous route" instruction, and given the 
theory of Ms. Holmstrom's case and the evidence that was 
7 
developed, the jury was, at best, left to wonder whether 
Mr. Hyatt's selection of the unsafe route was meaningless in 
the law. As explained by this Court in Biswell v. Duncan, 724 
P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987): "failure to give a requested 
jury instruction constitutes reversible error ... if the 
omission ... insufficiently ... advises the jury on the law." 
(Emphasis added.) That is precisely the situation here, and 
this Court should reverse and remand by reason of the Court's 
refusal to give a jury instruction to Ms. Holmstrom was 
entitled, regardless of what it does with the other issues on 
appeal. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE "SUDDEN 
PERIL" INSTRUCTION PROPOSED BY MS. HOLMSTROM 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The "MUJI" stock instruction, number 4.3, dealing with 
"sudden peril/' a situation in which Ms. Holmstrom, on the 
essentially uncontroverted facts of this case, clearly and by 
reason of Mr. Hyatt's making his blind turn found herself, is 
ambiguously worded. As Ms. Holmstrom's counsel explained in 
the conference on jury instructions (Tr. Vol. V, 819-20), and 
as she explained in her Opening Brief, at 18-19, there was a 
substantial risk that if this "MUJI" instruction, as worded, 
had been used, and if the jury had somehow determined that one 
or more of the three discrete predicates set forth in that 
stock instruction had not been satisfied, the jury would 
8 
conclude that it had no choice but to determine that there was 
no proximate cause connection between Mr. Hyatt's negligence 
and Ms. Holmstrom' s injuries and damages. The "sudden peril" 
instruction, in concept, is a pro-plaintiff instruction that 
fits some, but not all situations. It fit, in concept, the 
instant situation. Ms. Holmstrom submitted a proposed 
instruction which was not ambiguous, which correctly stated 
the law, and which was, contrary to the District Court's 
determination (Tr. Vol. V, 820), not confusing. It 
substantially varied from the MUJI instruction only in its use 
of the language "if, but not only if" as opposed to simply 
"if." It, like the unsafe route instruction, was central to 
Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case. Under the authority of 
Watters v. Query, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981) (see quote set 
forth at pages 15 and 16 of Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief), 
and the Hamilton, Startin, and Biswell cases cited in her 
Opening Brief and hereinabove, Ms. Holmstrom was entitled to 
have her theory of the case submitted to the jury, and it 
constituted prejudicial, reversible error for the District 
Court to refuse to give the instruction she proposed. 
A review of the transcript of the jury instruction 
conference dealing with the proposed instruction (Tr. Vol. V, 
819-22) makes it clear that the District Court had determined 
not to include the "if, but not only if" language and would 
9 
give a further modified instruction only if a "balancing 
sentence" which stated that if the imminent peril was caused 
by the plaintiff's own conduct the instruction should be 
disregarded. What appellees requested, and what the District 
Court agreed would be appropriate, with respect to the 
"disregarding" language, would have been unnecessary and 
confusing surplusage. 
Ms. Holmstrom acknowledges that there was no record of 
further discussion or ruling of the District Court with 
respect to the sudden peril instruction she submitted. She 
urges this Court nonetheless to recognize that the District 
Court had made up its mind not to give the instruction 
proposed by Ms. Holmstrom; and she calls to the Court's 
attention her counsel's statement {id., 820) that the proposed 
instruction would be withdrawn if the District Court would 
give the instruction only if the "if but not only if" language 
were removed. Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court to accept the 
proposition that, given her theory of the case, the District 
Court committed reversible error in refusing to give the 
instruction as submitted. Any tinkering with the instruction 
proposed would have led to a confusing and unsatisfactory 
instruction; and the instruction proposed by Ms. Holmstrom was 
the correct one to be given. It was not incumbent on 
Ms. Holmstrom's counsel, given the District Court's ruling and 
10 
statements, to try to come up with something that would 
satisfy appellees' counsel and the District Court. 
Accordingly, because the "sudden peril" instruction was 
central to Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case, and because 
there was nothing inaccurate or inappropriate or confusing 
about the proposed instruction submitted by Ms. Holmstrom, the 
Court should, whatever it does with the other issues in this 
appeal, rule that the District Court's refusal to give the 
instruction as submitted constituted reversible error and 
should reverse and remand for a new trial. 
C. APPELLEES FAIL TO RECKON WITH THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF 
THE COLLISION AND ERRONEOUSLY SUGGEST THAT 
MS. HOLMSTROM IS ASKING THIS COURT TO IGNORE SETTLED 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION. 
C.R. England and Mr. Hyatt grossly overplay and take out 
of context the testimony of Ronald Probert, Ms. Holmstrom's 
accident reconstructionist, on which they heavily rely for 
their position in this appeal. They cite and quote 
Mr. Probert's trial testimony, at page 4 and at page 13 of 
their Brief, for the proposition that the wreck would likely 
have happened even if Mr. Hyatt had stayed in his own lane. 
What they fail to reckon with and what is essential for the 
Court to understand is the dynamic nature of the subject 
collision. C.R. England and Mr. Hyatt would apparently have 
this Court believe that Mr. Hyatt's vehicle was in a 
11 
stationary location for a substantial period of time when 
Ms. Holmstrom came obliviously along the road; that because 
Ms. Holmstrom was so far over the center lane herself, the 
wreck would have happened in any event; and that, therefore, 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence was of no consequence. The Court will 
see, however, from its review of the trial transcript, 
including those parts that are cited in Ms. Holmstrom's 
Opening Brief, that the dynamics of the subject collision are 
in fact similar to those involved in crashes that occur in the 
following scenario: one driver negligently goes across the 
center line and the other driver, guessing wrong, thinks that 
the first driver will stay in the wrong lane; the second 
driver goes left but the first driver at the last instant goes 
back into his own lane; the collision occurs in the first 
driver's lane of travel; and the second driver, from a 
superficial perspective, "causes" the collision. 
Here, and as appellees' own accident reconstructionist, 
Dr. Ronald Woolley, acknowledged (see discussion set forth in 
Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief at 41), this was a dynamic 
situation unfolding. Tr. Vol. Ill, 686. A careful reading of 
the testimony of Dr. Woolley, especially those portions cited 
at pages 41-42 of Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief, will cause 
the Court to realize that Ms. Holmstrom was put into a 
situation not of her making when Mr. Hyatt started his turn 
12 
and that she was attempting to react to what he was doing when 
she attempted to swerve to where daylight was opening up (to 
her left) and that, because her brakes locked, she went 
straight ahead. See unrebutted testimony of Ronald Probert, 
Tr. Vol. II, 225-26. One of the most telling pieces of 
testimony in this regard was Dr. Woolley acknowledging that, 
as Ms. Holmstrom was driving along, she didn't know that 
Mr. Hyatt was going to make the wide turn he was attempting to 
make and she didn't know he wasn't going to stop and be safe 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, 733). There is no reason to doubt that 
testimony of Dr. Woolley or that of Ms. Holmstrom's Dr. Paul 
France, who testified, as explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening 
Brief at 38-39, that Ms. Holmstrom's expectation when she 
first saw the England truck creeping toward her to make a 
right-hand turn would be that the truck was going to initiate 
a right-hand turn without intruding into her driving space and 
that she had to make a judgment at the time she realized that 
the truck was coming too far out and coming into her lane of 
travel (Tr. Vol. II, 298-99); that Ms. Holmstrom had a very 
short time to make the judgment she had to make; and that it 
was reasonable for her to assume that the driver of the truck 
was going to do something to stay out of her way {id., 319). 
Given the entirety of the circumstances, and given the fact 
that Ms. Holmstrom, like Mr. Hyatt, would take approximately a 
13 
second and a half (e.g., Woolley testimony, Tr. Vol. IV, 714) 
to perceive and react to an imminent collision-causing 
impetus, and that it would take Mr. Hyatt, from the time he 
began to perceive and react until the time he stopped his 
truck, three to four seconds {id., 717-18), and that there was 
only 125 feet between the time Ms. Holmstrom first saw the 
truck and the point of collision {id., 674-75), the only 
reasonable inference is that Mr. Hyatt's truck came to a stop 
almost immediately prior to impact. 
Nor is there, given the dynamics of the situation, any 
reason to doubt Ms. Holmstrom's own testimony that if the 
truck had stopped when it was even close to being on its own 
side of the road she would have made a slight adjustment to 
the right and driven right on past the truck (Tr. Vol. Ill, 
560-61). 
Also inaccurate and unfair is appellees' contention 
(Appellees' Brief at 13) that Ms. Holmstrom 
suggests that any time a jury finds a defendant 
negligent, that jury must also find that there was a 
cause and effect relationship and that the defendant's 
negligence must have played a substantial role in causing 
the injuries. 
Ms. Holmstrom has never suggested such a thing. It is 
simply that, on the facts of this particular case, where Ms. 
Holmstrom unquestionably sustained severe injuries as a result 
of the collision and where Mr. Hyatt's conduct was by no means 
14 
a de minimis factor in causing the injuries, the jury's no-
proximate-cause verdict should not be allowed to stand. 
D. THERE WAS EITHER NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH REASONABLE 
JURORS COULD HAVE BASED THE NO-PROXIMATE-CAUSE 
VERDICT, OR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT 
VERDICT, AND THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT MS. HOLMSTROM'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL DIRECTED VERDICT AND MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL JNOV OR TO GRANT HER A NEW TRIAL ON ALL 
ISSUES. 
The reason that Ms. Holmstrom has marshaled the evidence 
conceivably in support of the jury's verdict is that the law 
requires an appellant to do so. The fact that it took five 
pages of her Opening Brief to set forth all evidence 
conceivably in support of a verdict does not mean that there 
was any evidence that, when the case and the dynamics of the 
collision are fully understood, truly supports the jury's no-
proximate-cause verdict. Ms. Holmstrom's counsel have, in 
setting forth what they have set forth, simply attempted to 
comply with recognized rules of appellate procedure and 
practice. Ms. Holmstrom maintains that, when the evidence is 
understood in context, there is either no evidence or 
insufficient evidence that truly supports the jury's 
conclusion that there was no cause-and-effeet relationship 
between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's damages or 
that Mr. Hyatt's negligence did not play a substantial role in 
causing Ms. Holmstrom's injuries and damages. For there is no 
15 
reason to think the injurious co l l i s ion would have happened if 
Mr. Hyatt had not done what he did ( i n i t i a t i n g a turn in to a 
b l ind in te rsec t ion when he could not see Ms. Holmstrom's 
vehicle coming and causing her to guess wrong in her emergency 
r eac t i on ) . And, given the gravity of Mr. Hyat t ' s e r ro r s , as 
compared to the lack, or paucity, of e r rors committed by 
Ms. Holmstrom,3 there i s no evidence (for Rule 50 purposes), or 
insuf f ic ien t evidence (for Rule 59 purposes), to support the 
conclusion that the negligence of Mr. Hyatt was so s l i g h t , or 
the negligence, i f any, of Ms. Holmstrom was so great , as to 
render Mr. Hyatt 's negligence not " subs tan t ia l " in causing 
Ms. Holmstrom's in ju r ies and damages. 
Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court to review the port ions of 
the t r i a l evidence set forth in the marshaling section of her 
Opening Brief (at pages 29-42) and to make i t s own 
determination as to whether, when the evidence i s understood 
in context, there was evidence suf f ic ien t , for Rule 50 or for 
Rule 59 purposes, to support the verd ic t , keeping in mind tha t 
3
 See, e . g . , Mr. H y a t t ' s own test imony t h a t he did not th ink Ms. Holmstrom 
was ac t ing unreasonably (Tr. Vol. I I , 159); t h a t he had to y i e l d the r i g h t 
of way (Tr. Vol. IV, 626); and h i s acknowledgment t h a t he sa id something 
l i k e " I d i d n ' t see you; I d i d n ' t see you" to Ms. Holmstrom immediately 
a f t e r the c o l l i s i o n occurred (Tr. Vol. I I , 161); a p p e l l e e s ' Dr. Woolley 's 
tes t imony tha t Ms. Holmstrom was not d r iv ing a t an unreasonable speed (Tr. 
Vol. IV, 671-72); Dr. Woolley's test imony t h a t i t ' s "kind of n a t u r a l " when 
one i s coming out of the S-curve to " s l i c e the corner , kind of s t r a i g h t e n 
out the curve" {id., 731); and the i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r ' s tes t imony t h a t 
he does not th ink i t ' s unreasonable for people to glance down a t a 
speedometer or to glance down at a clock (Tr. Vol. V, 802). 
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the focus needs to be on the cause-and-effeet and "substantial 
role" prongs of proximate causation law and not on the 
question of Mr. Hyatt's negligence (a fact found by the jury) 
or Ms. Holmstrom's negligence (a question that the jury, given 
the way the verdict form was laid out, never answered). 
If it does not determine that the District Court 
committed reversible error in refusing to give the "hazardous 
route" instruction and/or the "sudden peril" instruction 
propounded by Ms. Holmstrom, this Court should conclude, based 
on all the evidence and all the circumstances, that the 
District Court committed reversible error (1) in allowing the 
question of the proximate cause connection between Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's injuries and damages to go to 
the jury and in denying her Rule 50(b) motion for partial 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that question; or (2) 
in denying Ms. Holmstrom's Rule 59-based motion for a new 
trial on all issues, based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict. Different standards, as 
explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief at 4-7, govern 
these two separate questions. Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court 
to recognize that the District Court should have granted her 
one or the other forms of relief, that its failure to do so 
constituted reversible error, and that Ms. Holmstrom is, 
accordingly, entitled to a new trial consistent with the 
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Court's determination as to which of those separate prongs of 
her argument is correct, 
E. MS. HOLMSTROM STANDS BY HER CONTENTION THAT CASE LAW 
FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORTS HER POSITION AND 
POINTS OUT THAT APPELLEES HAVE BROUGHT TO THE 
COURT'S ATTENTION NO CASE IN WHICH A NO-PROXIMATE-
CAUSE DETERMINATION IN A SITUATION SIMILAR TO THIS 
ONE HAS BEEN UPHELD. 
As with their response to Ms. Holmstrom's citing of 
pedestrian cases in connection with her unsafe-route jury 
instruction argument, appellees criticize (Appellees' Brief at 
18) Ms. Holmstrom for failing to lay out the facts of the 
proximate-cause cases from other jurisdictions that she has 
cited. As with the criticism of her citing those pedestrian 
cases, appellees' criticism in this regard is ill-founded. 
Ms. Holmstrom assumes, as explained hereinabove, that the 
Court will read cases that are cited. Ms. Holmstrom submits 
that a careful reading of the California, New York, and 
Connecticut cases she had cited and discussed, at page 46-48 
of her Opening Brief, will cause the Court to conclude that 
the analyses set forth in those cases support her position 
that, in circumstances such as those involved in this 
litigation, no fair-minded jury could appropriately determine, 
having found Mr. Hyatt negligent, that that negligence was not 
a proximate cause of the wreck and, in the circumstances here 
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present, of Ms. Holmstrom's concededly significant orthopedic 
injuries and damages. 
V. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court, based on the record of 
this case, the particulars of the dynamics leading to the 
subject collision, and the points and authorities discussed in 
her Opening Brief and in this Brief, to reverse the District 
Court and to remand for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this P>l day of February, 2000. 
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